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Abstract
Counterfactual Regret Minimization and variants (e.g. Public Chance
Sampling CFR and Pure CFR) have been known as the best approaches
for creating approximate Nash equilibrium solutions for imperfect infor-
mation games such as poker. This paper introduces CFR+, a new al-
gorithm that typically outperforms the previously known algorithms by
an order of magnitude or more in terms of computation time while also
potentially requiring less memory.
1 Introduction
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR)[1] is a technique for solving extensive-
form games with imperfect information. CFR and its numerous variants are
based on regret-matching[2], a self-playing game-theoretic technique that
chooses strategies proportional to positive cumulative regrets. In this tech-
nical report, we introduce a new CFR-like algorithm that instead uses a new
variant of regret-matching that is empirically shown to perform better by an
order magnitude or more.
2 Algorithm
The most straightforward CFR variant is often called ”vanilla CFR” (or just
CFR). In this variant, the entire tree is traversed at each iteration and no
sampling is performed. There are four common ways vanilla CFR can be im-
plemented in:
Simultaneous updates / scalar-form Alternating updates / scalar-form
Simultaneous updates / vector-form Alternating updates / vector-form
With Simultaneous updates, each iteration has a single pass where both
players’ regrets and strategies are updated. In alternating updating, there are
two passes, in which one player is updated in each pass. The difference between
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scalar and vector forms can be found in [3]. CFR+ is a vector-form, alternatingly
updating algorithm.
CFR+ substitutes the regret-matching algorithm used in CFR with a new
algorithm, regret-matching+. Using the definition of counterfactual value
vi(σ, I) in [3], define the cumulative counterfactual regret
+ at information
set I for action a up to time T as
R+,Ti (I, a) =
{
max{vi(σTI→a, I)− vi(σT , I), 0} T = 1
max{R+,T−1i (I, a) + vi(σTI→a, I)− vi(σT , I), 0} T > 1
The new strategy is produced by:
σT+1 =

R+,Ti (I,a)∑
a′∈A(I) R
+,T
i (I,a
′)
if the denominator is positive
1
|A(I)| otherwise
Unlike in CFR, with CFR+ the current strategy profile empirically either ”al-
most” converges or converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium directly, so no
averaging step is necessary. However, using weighted averaging, the strate-
gies can be further optimized to converge faster. The weight sequence used in
CFR+ is simply wT = max {T − d, 0}, where d is the averaging delay in number
of iterations. Figure 2 shows an example of the effect delaying can have.
The implementation is described in more detail in Algorithm 1. See[3] for
the meaning of the symbols used.
3 Compressibility
Another advantage of CFR+ is that many of the cumulative regret values are
zero, whereas in CFR, negative regret continues to accumulate indefinitely.
This reduces the entropy of the data needed during the computation. Using
techniques such as fixed-point arithmetic (instead of floating-point arithmetic),
linear and non-linear prediction, context modeling and arithmetic coding (or
Asymmetric Numeral Systems), high compression ratios can be attained in large
poker games. Details of CFR+ and compression are outside the scope of this
paper and will be discussed in a future publication.
4 Results
We compare CFR+ to the fastest CFR variant seen during our tests in one-card
poker, the vector-form vanilla CFR with alternating regret updates — the same
form CFR+ uses.
Figure 1 shows a comparison of CFR+ with vanilla CFR in a one-card poker
game using various deck sizes. The vertical axis is the number of iterations
needed to get the exploitability below one millibets per hand. We observe that
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(1) CFR+ current strategy seems to converge slowly when the deck size is small
and (2) CFR+ average strategy converges more than an order of magnitude
faster than CFR.
Figure 2 shows a No Limit Texas Hold’em subgame starting after the preflop
betting, with a 5-milliblind target exploitability. An action abstraction that
allows three different bet sizes is used. Again, we see a similar difference in
performance.
5 Conclusion
In this technical report, we briefly introduced CFR+, compared it to CFR,
showing more than an order of magnitude improvement in converge time. In a
future paper, we will attempt to explain the mathematics behind the algorithm
in more detail.
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Algorithm 1 CFR+ Algorithm
1: Initialize regret tables: ∀I, rI [a]← 0.
2: Initialize cumulative strategy tables: ∀I, sI [a]← 0.
3:
4: function CFR+(h, i, w, ~pi−i):
5: if h ∈ Z then
6: return ~fc,i(h) ~ui
(
h | ~pi−i  ~fc,−i(h)
)
7: end if
8: ~u← ~0
9: if h ∈ P then
10: for a ∈ A(h) do
11: ~u′ ←CFR+(ha, i, w, ~pi−i)
12: ~u← ~u+ fc(a|h)~u′
13: end for
14: return ~u
15: end if
16: ~I ← lookupInfosets(h)
17: ~σ ← regretMatching+(~I)
18: if P (h) = i then
19: for a ∈ A(h) do
20: ~u′ ←CFR+(ha, i, w, ~pi−i)
21: ~m[a]← ~u′
22: ~u← ~u+ ~σ[a] ~u′
23: end for
24: for I ∈ ~I do
25: for a ∈ A(I) do
26: rI [a]← max{rI [a] +m[a][I]− u[I], 0}
27: end for
28: end for
29: else
30: for a ∈ A(h) do
31: ~pi′−i ← ~σ[a] ~pi−i
32: ~u′ ←CFR+(ha, i, w, ~pi′−i)
33: ~u← ~u+ ~u′
34: end for
35: for I ∈ ~I do
36: for a ∈ A(I) do
37: sI [a]← sI [a] + pi−i[I]σ[a][I]w
38: end for
39: end for
40: end if
41: return ~u
42: end function
43:
44: function CFR+(d):
45: for t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} do
46: for i ∈ N do
47: CFR+(∅, i,max{t− d, 0},~1)
48: end for
49: end for
50: end function
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Figure 1: One-card poker iterations vs. deck size
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Figure 2: No Limit Texas Hold’em flop subgame
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